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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the U.S. Congress established the United States
Court of International Trade (the "CIT") by enacting the Cus-
toms Court Act of 1980.1 Prior to creation of the CIT much con-
fusion surrounded the jurisdiction of its predecessor, the United
States Customs Court.2 Some district courts refused to hear ac-
tions relating to international trade matters, while others as-
serted jurisdiction over international trade matters.3
In establishing the CIT, Congress sought to construct a
comprehensive system of judicial review of civil actions arising
from import transactions.4 Congress granted the newly created
CIT exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the United
States arising out of statutes governing import transactions.5
The purpose behind granting the CIT such jurisdiction was to
eliminate jurisdictional conflicts between federal district courts
and the United States Customs Court and to ensure uniformity
of interpretation of U.S. international trade law.6
The CIT's exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions com-
menced by private parties against the United States is described
in Section 1581 of Title 28. Section 1581 provides that the CIT
1. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified
at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), rerinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN.
3729, 3730 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1235].
3. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3741; see, eg., SCM Corp. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction over action to compel
U.S. International Trade Commission to set aside negative determination of injury
under Antidumping Act of 1921 proper in Customs Court, hot federal district court);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Committee for the Implementation of Tex-
tile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978) (Cus-
toms Court has exclusive jurisdiction of action seeking declaratory judgment and
mandatory injunction against administration of U.S. program regulating by quota im-
portation of textiles and textile products); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396
(2d Cir. 1977) (federal district court has jurisdiction over action challenging trade
agreements); Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (federal district court
has jurisdiction over action to enjoin Secretary of Treasury from refusing to impose
antidumping duty on imported goods).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3731.
5. Id. at 3732.
6. Id. at 3739, 3741.
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shall have exclusive jurisdiction over nine different types of civil
actions.7 The first eight types of civil actions refer to particular
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 1581 provides:
§ 1581. Civil Actions against the United States and agencies and officers
thereof
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or
in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(b) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(c) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced under section 516A'of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(d) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to review -
(1) any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223
of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of workers for
adjustment assistance under such Act;
(2) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section
251 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a firm
for adjustment assistance under such Act; and
(3) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section
271 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a com-
munity for adjustment assistance under such Act.
(e) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to review any final determination of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury under section 305(b) (1) of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979.
(0 The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action involving an application for an order directing the adminis-
tering authority or the International Trade Commission to make confiden-
tial information available under section 777(c) (2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(g) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to review -
(1) any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs bro-
ker's license under section 641(b) (2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
or to deny a customs broker's permit under section 641(c) (1) of such
Act, or to revoke a license or permit under section 641(b) (5) or
(c) (2) of such Act;
(2) any decision, of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a
customs broker's license or permit, or impose a monetary penalty in
lieu thereof, under section 641(d) (2) (B) of the Tariff Act of 1930;
and
(3) any decision or order of the Customs Service to deny, suspend, or
revoke accreditation of a private laboratory under section 499(b) of
the Tariff Act of 1930.
(h) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the
goods involved, a ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a re-
fusal to issue or change such a ruling, relating to classification, valuation,
rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements, draw-
backs, vessel repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing
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situations over which the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, the CIT has jurisdiction over the denial of a protest, the
refusal to pay drawback, the imposition of antidumping and
countervailing duties, the denial, revocation, or suspension of a
customs broker's license, and determinations concerning eligi-
bility for trade adjustments under the Trade Act of 1974. As
Judge Carman of the CIT has stated, litigants must "slide exactly
into a glove of eight jurisdictional fingers, known as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a)-(h) or [they] are out of court."'
If a civil litigant cannot "slide into one of the eight jurisdic-
tional fingers," he or she may try to argue that nevertheless, the
CIT has jurisdiction over the action under the so-called
"residual" jurisdiction provision of Section 1581. Section
1581 (i) provides that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over any
civil action commenced against the United States that arises out:
of any law providing for:
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably
harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to such
importation.
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Interna-
tional Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the excep-
tion set forth in subsection (j) of this section, the Court of International
Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any
law of the United States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of public health
or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred
to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of
this section.
This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty determination which is reviewable either by the Court of Interna-
tional Trade under section 516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or by a binational
panel under article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement or the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and section 516A(g) of the Tariff
Act of 1930.
(j) The Court of International Trade shall not have jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Id.
8. Gregory W. Carman, Remarks Before the Conference on International Business Practie
on Practice Before the United States Court of International Trade, 2 FED. Cm. B.J. 123 (1992).
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(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of reve-
nue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the im-
portation of merchandise for reasons other than the pro-
tection of public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the mat-
ters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) and [28 U.S.C.
§ 1581 (a)-(h)]. 9
Accordingly, the residual jurisdiction provision "expands the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the [CIT].""0 The legislative history of the
residual jurisdiction provision states that the purpose of the pro-
vision is to:
eliminate the confusion which currently exists as to the de-
marcation between the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts and the Court of International Trade... [although]
the [Judiciary] Committee did not intend to create any new
causes of action, but merely to designate definitively the ap-
propriate forum.'1
The Customs Court Act of 1980 did not entirely eliminate
the confusion for international trade litigants with respect to
which court has jurisdiction over matters related to U.S. interna-
tional trade law. Based in part upon a Supreme Court case in-
volving a challenge to customs regulations governing the impor-
tation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade
names,12 some federal courts have been hesitant to find the CIT
has exclusive jurisdiction over some actions that are arguably re-
lated, either directly or indirectly, to U.S. international trade
laws.13 Fortunately, language in the recent decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Conoco, Inc. v. United
States appears to have clarified the jurisdictional boundaries of
the CIT.'4
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 3758.
11. Id. at 3745.
12. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 176, 186 (1988).
13. See, e.g., International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Phibro Energy, Inc. v.
Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993); Conoco, Inc. v. United States, 790 F.
Supp. 279 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992), rev'd, 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
14. 18 F.d 1581, 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[Section 1581(i)] was intended to give
the Court of International Trade broad residual authority over civil actions arising out
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To understand whether Conoco has also broadened the juris-
dictional boundaries of Section 1581(i), this Article first dis-
cusses the Federal Circuit decision in Conoco. It then briefly re-
views a sampling of case law on Section 1581(i) prior to Conoco.
This Article concludes that Conoco has not broadened the juris-
diction of the CIT, but rather it has directed courts to give effect
to Congress' intent to centralize adjudication of international
trade disputes in the CIT. Finally, this Article analyzes several
fact patterns, including facts from cases decided prior to Conoco,
to determine whether the CIT would have jurisdiction under
Section 1581(i) in light of Conoco.
I. CONOCO, INC. v. UNITED STATES
In Conoco, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over an action challenging a decision of the For-
eign Trade Zone Board ("FTZB").15 The plaintiffs, oil refinery
operators and a foreign trade zone 16 operator, applied to the
FTZB for a foreign trade zone subzone 1 7 The FTZB granted the
application subject to certain conditions."8 Pursuant to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,19 one of the oil refinery operators
and the foreign trade zone operator soughtjudicial review of the
FTZB's decision in federal district court.20 The government suc-
of federal statutes governing import transactions, and to eliminate the confusion over
whether jurisdiction lay in the Court of International Trade or the district courts.").
15. Id. The FTZB is a governmental entity that has the authority to grant to corpo-
rations the privilege of establishing, operating, and maintaining a foreign trade zone in
the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 81b (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FrZB consists of the
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Army.
Id. § 8la(b). The Secretary of Commerce functions as the chairman and executive of-
ficer of the FTZB. Id. The regulations governing the FTZB are contained in 15 C.F.R.
§ 400 (1994).
16. See 19 U.S.C. § Bb. A foreign trade zone is a geographical area located adja-
cent to or in a port of entry into the United States. The grantee of a zone has the
authority to permit others to operate within the zone subject to the approval of the
FIZB. Id. § 81m.
17. 18 F.3d at 1581. A subzone has all the characteristics of a zone except that it is
an area separate from an existing zone. 15 C.F.R. § 400.2(q).
18. 18 F.3d at 1583. The conditions imposed by the FTZB were: (1) that duties be
paid on foreign crude oil used as fuel (or refined into products used as fuel) in the
refineries; and, (2) that Conoco and Citgo elect "privileged foreign status" for foreign
crude oil brought into their respective subzones, i.e., elect to pay duties on the value of
that crude oil as opposed to the value of the refined products produced therefrom. Id.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. 18 F.3d at 1583.
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cessfully sought dismissal of the action, claiming that the CIT
had exclusive jurisdiction over the decision of the FTZB.21
When the plaintiffs commenced an action for judicial re-
view of the FIZB decision in the CIT, the government again
sought dismissal of the action, claiming (1) that no court had
jurisdiction to review the action of the FrZB, or, in the alterna-
tive, (2) that the plaintiffs did not meet the jurisdictional re-
quirements of Section 1581(i).22 Based on prior precedent2 s
that narrowly construed Section 1581(i), Judge Carman agreed
with the government that the plaintiffs did not meet the jurisdic-
tion requirements of Section 1581(i) because the plaintiffs failed
to file an administrative protest with Customs or to demonstrate
why jurisdiction under Section 1581(a) would be "manifestly in-
adequate."
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review the FTZB decision.24 The Federal Cir-
cuit reasoned that the plaintiffs did not have to file a protest with
Customs. While plaintiffs generally may not resort to jurisdic-
tion under Section 1581(i) without first exhausting administra-
tive remedies, the Federal Circuit noted that plaintiffs may resort
to jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) if jurisdiction under an-
other statute is "manifestly inadequate." The Federal Circuit
then concluded that requiring the plaintiffs to file an administra-
tive protest would be "manifestly inadequate" because Customs
could not overturn the action of a separate government
agency.25
The Federal Circuit stated further that the plaintiffs' claims
fell "easily" and "comfortably" within the text of Section
1581(i) (1) and (4).26 The Federal Circuit noted that there was
21. Id.
22. 790 F. Supp. 279 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992), rev'd, 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
23. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
24. 18 FSd 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1590.
26. Id. at 1588. Judge Plager stated:
As noted earlier, [Section 1581(i)] was intended to give the Court of Interna-
tional Trade broad residual authority over civil actions arising out of federal
statutes governing import transactions, and to eliminate the confusion over
whether jurisdiction lay in the Court of International Trade or the district
courts. On its face, subsection (i) is straightforward and comprehensive. The
language of subsection (i) granting to the Court of International Trade "ex-
clusive jurisdiction of any civil action.., that arises out of any law of the
United States providing for -," when coupled with the phrases in paragraph
1995] CONOCO, INC. V UNITED STATES
"little ground, for dispute" as to what is within the concept of
"revenue from imports" and "administration and enforcement"
of matters relating to revenue from imports." The Federal Cir-
cuit rejected the conclusion that the Foreign Trade Zone Act
("FTZA") only governs export transactions, stating that such a
narrow view of the FTZA "ignores commercial realities."2" Fi-
nally, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the CIT's acknowledged
expertise in customs and tariff issues supported its determina-
tion that jurisdiction was proper in the CIT.29 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit held that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction to
review the decision of the FTZB and remanded the case for adju-
dication on the merits.30
(i)(1) relating to "revenue from imports or tonnage" would seem easily to
embrace the matters appellants raise here. The foreign trade zones arise
under laws designed to deal with revenue from imports, and they provide a
special mechanism for determining revenue from materials imported into
these zones. In addition, paragraph (i)(4) refers to "administration and en-
forcement" with respect to the matters referred to in the earlier paragraphs, as
well as those covered in subsections (a) through (h). Again, a straightforward
reading of the statutory language indicates that the kinds of administrative
conditions placed on the grant to appellants falls comfortably within the scope
of that language.
Id.
27. Id. at 1589. Judge Plager continued:
In the case before us, there is little ground for dispute as to what is within the
concept of 'revenue from imports,' or what 'administration and enforcement'
means with regard to matters relating to revenue from imports. Furthermore,
there can be no question that we are here dealing with issues of governmental
law and policy regarding customs and tariffs, the type of issues with which the
Court of International Trade is acknowledged to have expertise. K Mart di-
rects that in determining the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade
under § 1581 we stay within the parameters of the statute. That of course is
unassailable advice; we have no difficulty in finding within the parameters of
subsection (i) the precise terms needed to cover the issues here.
Id.
28. Id. at 1590 n.24.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1590. On remand, the CrT held that the FTZB decision to impose condi-
tions on the granting of the subzone did not contain an "understandable basis" that
would permit the CIT to determine whether the FTZB acted within the scope of its
authority. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign Trade Zones Board, 855 F. Supp. 1306,
1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994). Accordingly, the CIT remanded the case to the FTZB for it
to articulate its reasons for imposing the conditions on the granting of the subzone. Id.
at 1312.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1581 (1) PRIOR
TO CONOCO
A. The "Manifestly Inadequate" Requirement
Case law interpreting Section 1581(i) establishes that where
it is possible for the CIT to have jurisdiction under another stat-
ute, civil litigants may not claim that the CIT has jurisdiction
under Section 1581(i) unless the other jurisdiction is "manifestly
inadequate."' As demonstrated in Conoco, the classic example
of a situation where jurisdiction under another statute is "mani-
festly inadequate" is where a plaintiff is required to challenge,
through administrative remedies, an action by Customs, over
which Customs has no discretion. 2
Where jurisdiction under another subsection is not "mani-
festly inadequate," jurisdiction under Section 1581 (i) is im-
proper.33 For example, in a dispute with Customs over the classi-
31. See, e.g., Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir.
1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 960 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Miller & Co. v. United States 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041
(1988); National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Phibro
Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993); Techsnabexport, Ltd.
v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 678 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
32. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Elec. America, Inc v. United States, - F.3d - (CAFC
1994) (jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) not Section 1581(a) where customs merely
collection agency for antidumping duties imposed by Department of Commerce);
Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 506 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (re-
quiring plaintiff to file protest with Customs where merchandise sought to be imported
was placed on prohibited import list by Secretary of Treasury under Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1986 would be manifestly inadequate because Customs had no discretion in prohibit-
ing importation); United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), aff'd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (CIT had jurisdiction over
action challenging Presidential Proclamation that established import quota proper
under Section 1581(i) because even though plaintiffs did not file protest requiring
plaintiffs to file protest would be "totally unreasonable" and "shocking" since Customs
did not have legal authority to grant protest); Luggage & Leather Goods Mfrs. of
America, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (requiring
plaintiffi to exhaust administrative remedies and obtain jurisdiction under Section
1581(b) would be manifestly inadequate in action challenging President's designation
of goods as GSP-eligible because Customs had no authority over authorization of GSP
eligibility); Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (filing
of protests in actions challenging requirements for importing textiles and textile prod-
ucts that were subject to quantitative limitations under bilateral trade agreements or
pursuant to unilaterally imposed restraints would be manifestly inadequate).
33. See, e.g., Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir.
1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 959 F.2d 960 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Miller & Co. v. United States 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987), wet. denied, 484 U.S. 1041
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fication of imported merchandise, an importer may not bypass
the administrative review process by asking the CIT to review
Customs' classification under Section 1581(i). Rather, the im-
porter must file a protest with Customs, receive a denial of the
protest, and then file suit in the CIT under Section 1581 (a) to
contest the denial of the protest. By interpreting Section
1581(i) narrowly, courts preserve the congressionally mandated
procedures and safeguards provided for in Section 1581(a)--
(h).s4
B. The "Arising Out Of" Requirement
In addition to showing that other jurisdictional provisions
are "manifestly inadequate," a litigant must also demonstrate
that his or her action "arises out of" a law providing for:
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of reve-
nue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the im-
portation of merchandise for reasons other than the pro-
tection of public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the mat-
ters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of [Section
1581(i)] and [Section 1581(i)] (a)-(h). 5
Prior to 1988, the CIT held that civil actions challenging the fol-
lowing acts "arose out of" a law described in Section 1581(i):
(1) exclusion of merchandise based on classification of the mer-
chandise in tariff provisions subject to quota,36 (2) calculation by
the Committee on the Implementation of Textile Agreements of
an import quota and the existence of market disruption,"7 (3)
(1988); National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Phibro
Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993); Techsnabexport, Ltd.
v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 678 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
34. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
36. Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981).
37. American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 591
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Associated Dry Goods
Corp. v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 473 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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the validity of a presidential proclamation imposing import quo-
tas on sugar,38 (4) the validity of regulations governing importa-
tion of textiles and textile products, 9 (5) the inclusion of mer-
chandise on a list prohibiting importation of certain products
from South Africa,4" (6) an Executive Order granting duty-free
status to certain goods imported from eligible countries, 4 1 (7)
Customs' revocation of a customhouse cartman's license,42 and
(8) Customs' denial of an application for a license to operate a
container station near an international airport. 
4
III. K-MART CORP. v. CARTIER, INC.
In K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., a five-to-three opinion, the
Supreme Court held that the CIT did not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Section 1581(i) (3) over an action challenging
the validity of Customs' regulations regarding the importation of
articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade names.44 The
defendants in K-Mart argued that jurisdiction in federal district
court was improper because the prohibition on unauthorized
importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade
names amounted to an "embargo" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 1581 (i) (3), a statute granting the CIT exclusive jurisdic-
tion.45
38. United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1982).
39. Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). f
40. Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 506 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987).
41. Luggage & Leather Goods Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
1413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
42. DiJub Leasing Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 1113 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
43. Air Cargo Servs., Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 296, 298 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) (quoting Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United States, 4 Crr 104, 105 (1982))
("Since the primary purpose of licensing... is for the protection of the governmental
revenue from imports, this action arises out of the administration and enforcement
with respect to a law of the United States providing for revenue from imports within the
purview of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(i) (1) and (4)."); see National Bonded Warehouse Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 904 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (Section 1581(i) (4) gave
CIT jurisdiction over action challenging validity of bonded warehouse annual fee
rates).
44. 485 U.S. 176 (1988). Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. In addition to Justice Brennan, the majority included Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. The dissent was written by Justice Scalia, and
joined byJustice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
45. Id. at 182.
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Rejecting the defendants' argument, the Supreme Court
held that jurisdiction was proper in federal district court.46 The
Court reasoned that the federal statute prohibiting the unau-
thorized importation of recorded trademarks and trade names47
did not amount to an "embargo" under Section 1581(i) (3).48
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Brennan narrowly defined
the term "embargo" as a governmentally imposed quantitative
restriction of zero on the importation of merchandise.49 Accord-
ing to the majority, the regulation at issue was not an "embargo"
because a private party, not the government, decided whether a
product could enter the United States.50
The Courtreasoned further that holding jurisdiction to be
proper in federal district court was consistent with the legislative
history of the Customs Court Act of 1980.1 According to the
majority, Congress did not intend the CIT to have exclusive juris-
diction over every suit against the government involving cus-
toms-related laws and regulations.52 Finally, the Court added
46. MS; see Giovanna M. Cinelli, Jurisdictional Quagmirr: The Implicatiors of K-Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, 16 SYaACUSEJ. INT'L L & COM. 39 (1989). Prior to K-Mart Corp., federal
courts interpreted Section 1581 (i) inconsistently with regard to the appropriate forum
for an action challenging the customs regulations governing importations of gray mar-
ket goods. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Court of International
Trade did not have exclusive jurisdiction over an action challenging the Customs Ser-
vice regulations prohibiting the importation of recorded trademarks and trade names.
See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, by contrast, held that the Court of International Trade did have
exclusive jurisdiction over such an action. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
48. 485 U.S. at 185. Justice Brennan reasoned:
Although we reject the Court of Appeals' analysis, we nevertheless agree with
its conclusion that § 526 does not impose an embargo. As the above-quoted
definitions suggest, the ordinary meaning of "embargo," and the meaning that
Congress apparently adopted in the statutory language "embargoes or other
quantitative restrictions," is a governmentally imposed quantitative restriction
- of zero - on the importation of merchandise.
An importation prohibition is not an embargo if rather than reflecting a
governmental restriction on the quantity of a particular product that will
enter, it merely provides a mechanism by which a private party might, at its
own option, enlist the Government's aid in restricting the quantity of imports




51. Id. at 187-88.
52. Id. Justice Brennan stated:
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that the CIT and its predecessor court did not have expertise in
the law at issue in the case - trademark law - and that Con-
gress did not intend the CIT to acquire such expertise.5 s
A dissent written by.Justice Scalia argued that while Section
1581 (i) does not define the term "embargo," the term "em-
bargo" should be construed according to its ordinary meaning. 4
Citing several dictionaries, Justice Scalia stated that the ordinary
meaning of the term "embargo" is "an import regulation that
takes the form of a governmental prohibition on imports, re-
gardless of any exceptions it may contain and regardless of its
ultimate purpose."55 Justice Scalia concluded that the chal-
lenged customs regulations amounted to government imposed
restrictions, rather than private restrictions, on imports. 6
Therefore, the regulations were an "embargo" under Section
1581 (i) (3) and jurisdiction was proper in the CIT, not in the
federal district court.
Congress did not commit to the Court of International Trade's exclusive juris-
diction every suit against the Government challenging customs-related laws and
regulations. Had Congress wished to do so it could have expressed such an
intent much more clearly and simply by, for example, conveying to the special-
ized court "exclusive jurisdiction... over all civil actions against the [Govern-
ment] directly affecting imports," or over "all civil actions against the [Govern-
ment] which arise directly from import transactions and which arise under the
Tariff Act of 1930."
In rejecting bills that would have implemented such a categorical ap-
proach, Congress opted for a scheme that achieved the desired goals of uni-
formity and clarity by delineating precisely the particular customs-related mat-
ters over which the Court of International Trade would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion.
Id at 188 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 189.
54. Id. at 191.
55. Id. at 195.
56. Id. at 193. According to Justice Scalia:
But if, despite its privately invocable exception, § 526(a) meets the require-
ment of being a prohibition, it unquestionably meets the requirement of be-
ing a governmentally imposed one.... Embargoes are imposed for many dif-
ferent purposes, including sometimes the protection of private rights. Assur-
edly those which have the latter purpose are different from those that do not,
but is beyond me why that purpose, any more than any other one, would cause
them not to be governmentally imposed import prohibitions.
Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF K-MART
A. District Court Interpretation of Section 1581(i) After K-Mart
In the aftermath of K-Mart, at least one federal district court
interpreted K-Mart to mean that courts should construe Section
1581 (i) strictly. In International Labor Rights Education & Research
Fund v. Bush, the federal district court for the District of Colum-
bia held that the CIT did not have exclusive jurisdiction over an
action by labor organizations alleging that the President failed to
enforce worker rights provisions of the Generalized System of
Preferences ("GSP") of the Trade Act of 1974.17 The GSP was a
program established to foster economic growth in designated
developing countries by permitting eligible goods to enter the
United States duty-free. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the Presi-
dent was required to deny preferential duty treatment to prod-
ucts originating in beneficiary countries if the beneficiary coun-
try did not meet certain worker rights standards.58 The plaintiffs
filed suit in federal district court alleging that the President
failed to investigate worker rights standards and thus improperly
granted GSP benefits.
Citing K-Mart, the district court reasoned it had jurisdiction
over the action because Congress did not give the CIT exclusive
jurisdiction over every action challenging customs-related laws,
only those described in Section 1581 (i).5 9 Characterizing the ac-
tion as one seeking an order directing the President to adopt
certain procedures for investigating worker rights, 60 and the GSP
statute as one providing for conditions under which duties may
be lifted, the district court reasoned that the GSP statute did not
provide for "tariffs, duties, fees or other taxes" within the mean-
ing of Section 1581(i).61 Accordingly, it found jurisdiction was
proper in the district court. 2 The court dismissed the plaintiffs'
suit after determining that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticia-
ble.63
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
57. 752 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
58. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(b), 2464(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. 752 F. Supp. at 491.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 492.
63. Id. at 495.
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trict of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court. However,
of the two judges voting to affirm the district court's dismissal of
the action, only one judge indicated that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.6 5 The other judge voting to
affirm the district court agreed with the district court that the
CIT did not have exclusive subject matterjurisdiction. 66 The dis-
sentingjudge also agreed with the district court that the CIT did
not have subject matter jurisdiction. 6" Thus the case was not af-
firmed on jurisdictional grounds.
Nonetheless, a majority of appellate judges reasoned that
the GSP statute was not a law described in Section 1581(i).68s
Judge Sentelle agreed with the district court that the GSP statute
did not "provide for" tariffs, duties, or fees. 69 Rather, tariffs, du-
ties, and fees are "provided for" by other statutes, not by the
GSP.7 ° Judge Sentelle explained that federal courts could not
interpret the words "providing for" as meaning "relating to."'
The one appellate judge who reasoned that the CIT had
exclusive jurisdiction, Judge Henderson, stated that the phrase
used in Section 1581 (i) (2), "providing for," could be interpreted
to mean "relating to."72 Under such an interpretation, the GSP
statute was a statute "relating to" tariffs, duties, and fees and the
CIT had exclusive jurisdiction. Judge Henderson also asserted
that because the plaintiffs effectively sought imposition of duties
on goods otherwise eligible for duty-free entry, the GSP statue
provided for the "administration and enforcement" of revenue
from imports and tariffs, duties and fees.' 3 Accordingly, the CIT
had jurisdiction over the action under Section 1581(i) (4).
Judge Henderson noted that the legislative history of the
Customs Court Act of 1980 supported her decision that the CIT
64. 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
65. Id. at 746 (Henderson, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 749 (Sentelle,J., concurring). Judge Sentelle voted to affirm the district
court decision based on the conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id.
* 67. Id. at 752 (Mikva, J., dissenting). The dissent would have reversed the district
court based on the dissent's belief that the claims were justiciable. Id.
68. Id. at 749, 752.
69. Id. at 749. Judge Mikva agreed with Judge Sentelle that the CIT did not have
subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Mikva did not address the jurisdictional issue, how-
ever, other than by stating thatjurisdiction was proper in the district court. Id at 752.
70. Id. at 749
71. Id
72. Id at 747.
73. Id.
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hadjurisdiction. 74 In light of Congress' desire that the CIT have
exclusive jurisdiction over tariff and international trade laws and
the fact that the GSP statute was enacted as part of the Trade Act
of 1974, jurisdiction was proper in the CIT.71 Finally, Judge
Henderson cited several CIT cases where the CIT found jurisdic-
tion over disputes arising under the GSP statute.
B. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Section 1581(i)
After K-Mart
After K-Mart, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did
not construe Section 1581(i) as narrowly as the federal district
court for the District of Columbia. 77 In Earth Island Institute v.
Christopher, the Ninth Circuit held that the CIT, not the federal
district court, had exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought
by an environmental organization to enforce statutory provisions
designed to promote the international protection of sea tur-
tles.78 The statute at issue in Earth Island Institute required the
U.S. Secretary of State to negotiate treaties with foreign coun-
tries to protect sea turtles from commercial shrimp fishing, to
certify that foreign countries have taken steps to protect sea tur-
tes, and to limit the importation of shrimp from non-certified
countries that do not protect sea turtles.7 The environmental
organization alleged that the government (1) did not initiate
treaty negotiations with foreign nations to protect sea turtles, (2)
did not properly certify foreign nations, and (3) did not ban the
importation of products from countries that do not protect sea
turtles.8 0
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that
the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegation that the
74. Id. at 747-48.
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id.
77. Earth Island Inst. v. Brown, 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1994); Earth Island Inst. v.
Christopher, 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993).
78. 6 F.3d at 651-52.
79. The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990 § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (Supp. V. 1993)). In the United States, federal regulations required com-
mercial shrimp trawl fishers to use "turtle excluder devices" to prevent turtles that are
trapped in nets from drowning. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (June 29, 1987).
80. 6 F.3d at 650.
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government improperly certified foreign nations, and the allega-
tion that the government failed to ban the importation of prod-
ucts from foreign countries that do not protect sea turtles.831 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the CIT did not have
exclusive jurisdiction because the ban on shrimp imports was an
environmental, rather than a trade, matter.8 2 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court stated in K-Mart that the CIT's
exclusive jurisdiction over embargoes is not limited to trade-re-
lated embargoes.8" Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that the
importation ban amounted to an "embargo" within Section
1581 (i) (3) as defined in K-Mart: the importation ban at issue
was a governmentally imposed quantitative restriction.84 Finally,
the Ninth Circuit noted that in conflicts between the jurisdiction
of the CIT and the district courts, courts should uphold the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the CIT. 5
One year later, the Ninth Circuit revisited the scope of the
CIT's exclusive jurisdiction. In Earth Island Institute v. Brown,86
the Ninth Circuit again held that the CIT had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over an action brought by the same environmental organi-
zation to require the government to enforce certain provisions
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"). The MMPA
required the Secretary of the Treasury to ban importation of
commercial fish and products of fish that have been caught with
commercial fishing technology that results in excessive inciden-
tal killing or serious injury of ocean mammals.88 Earth Island
Institute obtained a preliminary injunction in federal district
court based on its claim that the government failed to imple-
ment the importation ban. 9
81. Id. at 648. The Ninth Circuit held that it did have jurisdiction over the allega-
tion that the government failed to negotiate protective measures with foreign countries.
Id. at 652-54. It then found that that claim was non-justiciable. I& at 653. A dissent
criticized the majority for "parsing" apart the statute to address an issue not within the
jurisdiction of the CIT. Id. at 654 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Judge Brunetti would have
held that the CIT also had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim that the government
failed to negotiate protective measures for sea turtles with foreign countries. Id.




86. 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509 (1994).
87. Id. at 79; see 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (2) (C).
89. Earth Island Inst. v. Brown, 28 F.3d at 77.
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The Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked juris-
diction to grant the preliminary injunction.90 Citing its decision
in Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,91 the Ninth Circuit found
that the importation ban was an embargo within the meaning of
Section 1581 (i) (3) .92 The Ninth Circuit again rejected Earth Is-
land Institute's argument that Congress never intended to ex-
pand the CIT's jurisdiction beyond adjudicating trade matters
and other traditional areas in which it has expertise.93
C. CIT Interpretation of Section 1581(i) After K-Mart
After K-Mart, the CIT interpreted the text of Section
1581(i) narrowly in the context of actions arising out of the For-
eign Trade Zone Act. In Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Franklin,94 a case
decided prior to Conoco, the CIT held that it lacked jurisdiction
over an action seeking judicial review of the FTZB's denial of an
application for a foreign trade zone subzone.9" The plaintiffs in
Phibro argued that the CIT had jurisdiction over the action. Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the Free Trade Zone Act ("FTZA") re-
lated to tariffs and duties within the meaning of Section
1581 (i) (1)-(2), (4) because the FrZA determined whether and
when imports brought into Free Trade Zones are subject to cus-
toms liability.96
The CIT rejected that argument and held that it lacked ju-
risdiction under Section 1581(i). The CIT interpreted K-Mart to
mean that the CIT must scrutinize closely, all allegations that it
has jurisdiction under Section 1581 (i) and to adhere strictly to
the precise language of Section 1581 (i).91 Judge Carman rea-.
soned that the CIT did not have jurisdiction because the FTZA
does not authorize or provide for revenues or tariffs, or for the
administration and enforcement thereof.9 Rather, the FTZA es-
tablishes standards for the Free Trade Zone Board to apply in
the Free Trade Zone application process.99 Additionally, Judge
90. Id. at 79.
91. 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993).
92. Earth Island Inst. v. Brown, 28 F.3d at 78.
93. Id.
94. 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
95. Id, at 761.
96. Id. at 760.
97. Id at 763.
98. Id at 763-64.
99. Id, at 764.
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Carman reasoned that jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) is im-
proper because the purpose of Free Trade Zones is to promote
exports, while the thrust of Section 1581(i) is to grant the CIT
jurisdiction over import-related matters.100
The CIT, however, did not interpret K-Mart to preclude it
from finding that it had jurisdiction over an action brought to
require the Department of Treasury and the Commissioner of
Customs to promulgate regulations affecting the hierarchy of
brokers entitled to enter goods. 10 ' In National Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Ass'n of America v. United States ("NCBFAA"), the plain-
tiff alleged that Customs incorrectly implemented a statute re-
quiring courier services to employ licensed brokers when enter-
ing consolidated shipments. 10 2 Customs permitted couriers to
enter merchandise by reference to a master bill of lading on
which individual entries were logged.'0 3 Thus, the couriers' bro-
kers entered merchandise without necessarily following the in-
structions on individual bills of lading. The NCBFAA asserted
that Customs should require couriers to deconsolidate ship-
ments and enter merchandise according to specific instructions
on individual bills of lading, where an individual bill of lading
designates a port of entry or broker other than that used by the
courier.10 4 In finding that it had jurisdiction, the CIT held that
the plaintiff's action was "not only intertwined with the adminis-
tration and enforcement of the laws dealing with tariffs... but
raises issues related to subsidiary areas clearly within the court's
jurisdiction."0 5 Further, the CIT noted that such areas are
within the expertise of the CIT, not the expertise of federal dis-
trict courts.
10 6
In Sharp Electronics Corp. v. United States,"' the CIT held that
Section 1581 (i) also gave it jurisdiction over an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that a settlement agreement reached as
100. Id.
101. See National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Ass'n of America v. United
States, 723 F. Supp. 1511 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989), 731 F. Supp. 1076 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990).
102. 723 F. Supp. at 1513.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1514.
106. Id.
107. 720 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
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part of an antidumping proceeding was valid and enforceable.108
In the settlement agreement at issue, the plaintiff and the De-
partment of Commerce agreed to methods used to calculate the
value of imported merchandise for purposes of an antidumping
duty order. 9 The plaintiffs brought an action in the CIT asking
the court to declare the agreement valid and to require the gov-
ernment to adhere to the agreement.110 The government ar-
gued that the action involved contract interpretation and that a
federal district court, not the ClIT, had jurisdiction over the ac-
tion."' The CIT disagreed.11 2 Acknowledging the Supreme
Court's statement in K-Mart that the CIT does not have jurisdic-
tion over every suit involving customs-related laws, the CIT rea-
soned that contract claims that "directly challenge" the adminis-
tration and enforcement of customs laws are within the jurisdic-
tion of the CIT.11' As the Courtwould have to analyze and apply
antidumping duty law in interpreting the contract, the CIT held
that jurisdiction was proper under Section 1581 (i).114
The CIT also found that it had jurisdiction pursuant to Sec-
tion 1581 (i) over an action challenging the validity of annual fee
rates for bonded warehouses."' In National Bonded Warehouse
Ass'n v. United States, several warehouse owners brought an ac-
tion challenging the validity of bonded warehouse annual fee
rates.1 1 6 The government argued that the CIT lacked jurisdic-
tion because the warehouse owners failed to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies by filing a protest with Customs.117 After
determining that the plaintiffs were not required to file a protest
because the fees were non-protestable, the CIT held that it had
jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) (4) because the action arose
out of a law providing for the "administration and enforcement"
of import matters.118
108. Id. at 1016.
109. Id. at 1015.
110. It.
111. Id.
112. Id., at 1016.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. National Bonded Warehouse Ass'n v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 904 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 907.
118. Id. at 907-08.
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In Milin Industries, Inc. v. United States,119 the CIT found it
had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1581(i) over an action alleg-
ing that Customs improperly excluded the plaintiff's merchan-
dise by classifying the merchandise under a tariff item subject to
quota.1 20 Although Customs denied the plaintiff's protest and
the CIT ultimately held it had jurisdiction under Section
1581 (a), the CIT stated that it also had jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 1581 (i).121 Judge (now ChiefJudge) DiCarlo reasoned that
Customs' exclusion of the merchandise was based on its belief
that a quota violation existed.1 22 Review of Customs' action
would require the CIT to use its expertise to determine the
proper classification of the merchandise.1 25 As a result, the CIT
found that the action arose out of the administration and en-
forcement of a quantitative restriction on imported goods.'
24
V. CONOCO HAS RE-EMPHASIZED THE ROLE OF THE CIT
IN DECIDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES
The case law on Section 1581(i) discussed above consist-
ently demonstrates that courts analyzing jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 1581 (i) will consider: (1) whether other possible avenues of
jurisdiction are "manifestly inadequate," and (2) whether the
text of Section 1581(i) describes the plaintiff's action (e.g., the
plaintiff's action arose out of a law providing for revenue from
imports). Couirts will also consider whether resolution of the dis-
pute will require the CIT to apply its expertise in international
trade law issues. However, as the Earth Island Institute cases make
clear, the CIT'sjurisdiction is not limited to actions involving its
traditional expertise in international trade cases.
In Conoco, the Federal Circuit applied these principles
119. 691 F. Supp. 1454 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
120. Id. The plaintiff and the government disagreed on whether the merchandise
was "excluded" or "seized." The government argued that the merchandise was "seized"
when Customs refused to admit it into the United States and "seized" the merchandise
for failure to present the proper quota visas. I If found to be a "seizure," then juris-
diction would be proper only in federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (1988). The
CIT ultimately found that the merchandise was excluded, and then seized, and that the
importer properly filed a protest of the exclusion. 691 F. Supp. at 1454. Therefore, the
CIT had jurisdiction under Section 1581(a). Id.
121. 691 F.Supp. at 1458.
122. Id. at 1457.
123. I&
124. Id. at 1458.
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straightforwardly. First, the Federal Circuit concluded that re-
quiring the plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction by filing a protest was
"manifestly inadequate" because Customs had no discretion to
grant the protest.1 5 Second, the Federal Circuit stated that the
plaintiffs' claims in Conoco fell squarely within the language of
Section 1581 (i). 126 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the FTZA
was a law that provided for "revenue from imports" because the
FTZA "provide [s] a special mechanism for determining revenue
from materials imported into" a free trade zone.127 Additionally,
the FTZA provided for "administration and enforcement" of
laws providing for "revenue from imports" because of "the kinds
of administrative conditions placed upon the grant" to the plain-
tiffs. 128 Finally, the Federal Circuit bolstered its conclusion by
reasoning that the CIT's expertise in customs and tariff issues
was relevant to reviewing the decision of the FTZB.12a Thus, Co-
noco simply followed prior case law on Section 1581 (i).
In deciding the question of jurisdiction, Conoco instructs
courts to weigh heavily Congress' intent to create a national
court for adjudication of international trade law disputes:
It is thus apparent from the legislative history of § 1581 and
from the broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction given to the
Court of International Trade that Congress had in mind con-
solidating this area of administrative law in one place, and
giving to the Court of International Trade, with an already
developed expertise in international trade and tariff matters,
the opportunity to bring to it a degree of uniformity and con-
sistency. Obviously, that would not be possible ifjurisdiction
were spread among the district courts throughout the
land.130
Case law interpreting the text of Section 1581(i) prior to Conoco
often relied on the statement by the Supreme Court in K-Mart
that Congress did not intend to give the CIT exclusive jurisdic-
tion over every suit involving U.S. international trade laws.
While that is true, cases holding that the CIT did not have juris-
diction ignored equally persuasive legislative history that demon-
125. 18 F.Sd 1581, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 1588.
127. I
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1589.
130. Id. at 1586.
19951 747
748 FORDHAMINTERiVATIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol. 18:726
strated Congress' desire to centralize disputes over U.S. interna-
tional trade law in one forum and to broaden the CIT'sjurisdic-
tion. Additionally, the holding in K-Mart was limited to whether
the customs regulations governing the importation of articles
bearing recorded trademarks and trade names constitute an
"embargo" within the meaning of Section 1581(i) (3).1" Conoco
has broadened the CIT's residual jurisdiction only to the extent
that Cothoco re-emphasizes Congress' intent to centralize adjudi-
cation of international trade disputes in one national forum.
Conoco's instruction that courts should focus on Congress'
intent to centralize adjudication of disputes arising out of inter-
national trade laws has been followed in post-Conoco cases. In
Miami Free Trade Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Board,13 2 the
plaintiff-foreign trade zone operator brought an action in fed-
eral district court for judicial review of a decision of the FTZB
which granted a foreign trade zone application within the plain-
tiff's geographic district.'-" The district court dismissed the ac-
tion, stating that jurisdiction was proper in the CIT.8 4 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the action.18 5 The D.C. Circuit rejected
the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the FTZA is a law "provid-
ing for revenue from imports" under Section 1581(i) (1) or "pro-
viding for tariffs or duties" under Section 1581(i) (2).186 The
D.C. Circuit found however, that the CIT had jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's action under Section 1581(i) (4) since the FTZA
prescribes when duties may be lowered and promotes interna-
tional trade.' Accordingly, the FTZA may be described as a law
"providing for administration with respect to tariffs... for rea-
sons other than the raising of revenue."'8l Significantly, the
D.C. Circuit stated:
131. In fact, one may speculate whether K-Mart would be decided differently to-
day. Of the five justice majority, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court. All three
dissentingjustices, by contrast, are still on the Court. It is unclear howJustices Thomas,
Souter, Kennedy, Bader-Ginsburg, and Breyer would have decided the jurisdictional
issue in K-Mart.
132. 803 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
133. 803 F. Supp. at 443.
134. 1& at 444.
135. 22 F.3d 1110.
136. Id at 1112.
137. Id
138. Id.
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[N]ow that the Federal Circuit has decided [in Conoco] that
exclusive jurisdiction lies in the CIT and given the value of
uniformity in judicial review of these matters, we think the
better course is to follow our sister circuit and not create a
circuit conflict." 9
Therefore, it is apparent that Conoco has re-emphasized the
CIT's role in adjudicating international trade disputes. Of
course, as evidenced in the Harbor Maintenance Fee litigation
(discussed below), plaintiffs and the government will continue to
disagree over whether jurisdictional avenues to the CIT are
"manifestly inadequate" and whether a plaintiff's action arises
out of a law described in Section 1581 (i).
VI. APPLICATION OF CONOCO TO FUTURE ACTIONS
BROUGHT IN THE CIT
A. Action Challenging Constitutionality
of Harbor Maintenance Fee
On July 1, 1994, an action was filed in federal district court
in Baltimore, Maryland challenging the constitutionality of the
Harbor Maintenance Fee ("HMF").140 The HIMF is an ad valorem
tax of 0.125% that is levied on the value of commercial cargo
each time the cargo is loaded or unloaded on a commercial ves-
sel in a specified port of the United States.1 41 Companies ex-
porting goods by ship through a specified port must pay the
HMF 1 42 Congress enacted the HMF as part of the Water Re-
sources Development Act of 1986 for the purpose of creating a
trust fund that will be used to maintain U.S. harbors.14 At the
time of this writing, the government has moved to dismiss the
action, claiming that jurisdiction is proper in the CIT.144 Ap-
proximately one hundred actions, including two class actions,
have also been commenced in the CIT asserting jurisdiction is
139. Id. at 1113.
140. American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers, Inc. v. Bentsen, No. L94-1839, (D.
Md. filedJuly 1, 1994).
141. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461-4462 (1988 & Supp V. 1993).
142. Id. The HMF is also assessed on imports and on some domestic shipments.
143. S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), efpinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6639, 6709.
144. Government's Motion to Dismiss, filed Sept. 20, 1994, American Association
of Exporters & Importers v. Bentsen, No. L94-1839, (D. Md. July 1, 1994).
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proper under Section 1581(i) (1),(2), and (4).145 These actions
145. Itochu Int'l, No. 94-09-00525; U.S. Shoe Corp., No. 94-09-00526; Agrevo USA
Co., No. 94-09-00527; Celebrity Cruise, No. 94-09-00535; A&A Int'l, No. 94-10-00578;
Eastman Kodak, No. 94-10-00581; Etonic, Inc., No. 94-10-00615; IBM Corp., No. 94-10-
00625; General Chemical, No. 94-10-00635; Sumitomo Corp., No. 94-10-00636;
Thomaston Mills, No. 94-10-00637; Avon Products, No. 94-10-00638; Ingersoll-Rand,
No. 94-10-00650; Baxter Healthcare, No. 94-10-00650; Hewlett-Packard, No. 94-10-
00651; Xerox Corp., No. 94-10-00653; Xerox, Amer. Opns., No. 94-10-00654; Xerox,
So. Cal. Mfg., No. 94-10-00655; Zerox Int'l Partners, No. 94-10-00656; General Glass
Int'l, No. 94-10-00657; Fieldstone Clothes, No. 94-10-00658; Firmenich, Inc., No. 94-11-
00660; Outboard Marine, No. 94-11-00665; U.S. Shoe Corp., No. 94-11-00668; Itochu
Int'l, No. 94-11-00669; Isuzu Motors Amer., No. 94-11-00670; Agrevo USA, Co., No. 94-
11-00671; Mondial Int'l, No. 94-11-00682; United Grain Corp., 94-11-00691; Nissho Iwai
Amer., No. 94-11-00701; The Heil Co., No. 94-11-00704; Berwich Indus., No. 94-11-
00719; Uniroyal Chemical, No. 94-11-00720; Bunge Corp., No. 94-11-00726; Newell
Int'l, No. 94-12-00731; Siemens Energy, No. 94-12-00732; Int'l Veneer, No. 94-12-00749;
Liberty Gold Fruit, No. 94-12-00752; Polarois Corp., No. 94-12-00756; Amer. Soda Ash,
No. 94-12-00783; United Export, No. 94-12-00784; ABRO Indus., No. 94-12-00785; GSI
Exim America, No. 94-12-00786; Vitol S.A, Inc, No. 94-12-00787; MC Int'l, no. 94-12-
00788; Bridgestone/Firestone, No. 94-12-792; Siemens Solar, No. 94-12-00793; Arm-
strong Indus., 94-12-00802; FIsher Controls, No. 94-12-00803; Alpert & Alpert Int'l, No.
95-01-00013; Sunkist Growers, No. 95-01-00017; Alum. Co. of America, No. 95-01-
00033; Astra Oil Co., No. 95-01-00034; Westport Petroleum, No. 95-01-00035; Dorland
management, No. 95-01-00039; Unisys Corp., No. 95-01-00045; Amoco Chemical, No.
95-01-00048; Bartlett & Co. 95-01-00054; FAI Trading Co., No. 95-01-00056; Star Enter-
prise, No. 95-01-00057; Vista Chemical Co., No. 95-01-00058; Champion Int'l, No. 95-
01-00059; Champion Export, No. 95-01-00060; Seagate Technology, No. 95-01-00061;
Marubeni America, No. 95-01-00062; New Holand No. Am., No. 95-01-00065; IBM
Corp., No. 95-01-00069; E.I. Dupont, No. 95-01-00070; Atlantic Richfield, No. 95-01-
00075; Otis Elevator, No. 95-01-00076; Carrier Corp., No. 95-01-00077; Sikorsky Air-
craft, No. 95-01-00078; Turbo Power/Marine, No. 95-01-0079; ISP Technologies, No.
95-01-00080; Titan Textile, No. 95-01-00083; Dillon Yarn Co., No. 95-01-00084; Elcom,
Inc., No. 95-01-00085; Zen-Noh Grain, No. 95-01-00086; Texaco Refining, No. 95-01-
00087; Dresser Pump, No. 95-01-00088; Goodyear Tire, No. 95-01-00089; Goodyear
Int'l, No. 95-01-00090; Kelly-Spfld Tire, No. 95-01-00091; Ford Motor Co., No. 95-01-
00092; Fel-Pro, Inc., No. 95-01-00093; Germain-Webber, No. 95-01-00094; Boise-Cas-
cade, No. 95-01-00095; Glencore Ltd., No. 95-01-00098; FMC Corp., No. 95-01-00103;
FMC Wyoming Corp., No. 95-01-00104; Sofec, Inc., No. 95-01-00105; Inco Alloys Int'l,
No. 95-01-00106; ACX Trading, No. 95-01-00107; 3M Co., 95-01-00111; Aris-Isotoner,
No. 95-01-00114; Chevron USA, No. 95-01-00115; Chevron Chemical, No. 95-01-00116;
Chevron Chemical Int'l, No. 95-01-00117; Chevron Int'l Oil, No. 95-01-00118; Chevron
Overseas, No. 95-01-00119; Microsoft Corp., No. 95-01-00120; Pillsbury Co., 95-01-
00121; Rhone-Poulenc, No. 91-01-00122; Brown-Forman Corp., No. 95-01-00123; FMC
Corp., No. 95-01-00124; Itochu Int'l, No. 95-02-00131; Allied Textiles, No. 95-02-00145;
Sheftel Int'l, No. 95-01-00146; Fab-Tech, Inc., No. 95-01-00147; Sirex, Ltd., No. 95-02-
00148; Debois Textiles, No. 95-02-00149; Bollag Int'l, No. 95-02-00150; Capital Textiles,
No. 95-02-00151; M. Koppel Co., No. 95-02-00152; Dumont Export, 95-02-00153;
United Overseas, No. 95-02-00154; Regent Corp. 95-02-00155; Muran Universal, No.
95-02-00156; Texport Oil Co.', No. 95-02-00159; Alum. Co. of America, No. 95-02-
00163.
On February 15, 1995, the CIT selected United States Shoe Corp. v. United States as the
CONOCO, INC. V. UNTED STATES
argue that the HMF violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the
United States Constitution, which provides that "no tax or duty
shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Thus, the fed-
eral district court and the CIT again confront the issue of the
scope of the CIT's jurisdicton.
The legislative history of the Water Resources Development
Act of 1986 states that Congress intended the CIT to have juris-
diction over HMF disputes. 48 This intent, when combined with
Congress' intent to centralize adjudication of international trade
disputes in one forum, strongly suggests that the CIT is the ap-
propriate forum for resolution of these actions. However, in in-
dicating that it intended the CIT to have jurisdiction over HMF
disputes, Congress failed to specify which statute grants the CIT
jurisdiction. In its motion to dismiss the action filed in district
c6urt in Baltimore, and in its communications to the CIT Clerk's
office in connection with the HMF litigation commenced in the
CIT, the government has argued that jurisdiction under Section
1581(i) is improper and that plaintiffs must obtain jurisdiction
under Section 1581(a).47
While plaintiffs who are challenging the HMF may protest
payments of the HMF and, upon receiving a denial of the pro-
test, file suit in the CIT under Section 1581(a), there are several
problems with requiring plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction under
Section 1581 (a). One problem is that Customs has no authority
or discretion to grant the protests and has stated that it will deny
all protests challenging the constitutionality of the HMFf. 48
case to decide the jurisdictional and constitutional issues and stayed proceedings in all
other actions filed in the CIT contesting the constitutionality of the HMF as applied to
exports. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, slip op. 95-23, No. 94-11-00668 (Ct.
Int'l Trade Feb. 15, 1995) (scheduling order).
146. S. REP. No. 126, supra note 143, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), 7rinted in
1986 U.S.C.CA.N. 6639, 6715.
147. Government's Motion to Dismiss, filed Sept. 20, 1994, American Association
of Exporters Importers v. Bentsen, No. L94-1839 (D. Md. filed July 1, 1994); Govern-
ment's Response to Notice of the Clerk of the Court [CIT] Regarding Special Case
Management Procedures, Dec. 14, 1994, Bentsen (No. L94-1839).
148. Affidavit of David Kahne (Program Manager, User Fee Task Force, Customs
Headquarters Office of Inspection and Control), Submitted in Support of Govern-
ment's Motion to Dismiss, American Association of Exporters Importers v. Bentsen, No.
L94-1839 (D. Md.July 1, 1994).
It is my understanding that the Customs Service has received more than 100
protests contesting payment of the [HMF] on constitutional grounds and that
more protests are being received daily. It is also my understanding that the
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Thus, filing a protest is "manifestly inadequate." Conoco instructs
that plaintiffs are not required to obtain jurisdiction in the CIT
under Section 1581 (a) where filing a protest would be futile.
Another problem is the short statute of limitations associ-
ated with the filing of protests. A protest must be filed within
ninety days of the date U.S. Customs demands payment of the
HMF. 149 In the case of an HMF levied on exports, this would be
ninety days from the date of the quarterly HMF payment. 5
Therefore, an exporter wishing to challenge the constitutionality
of HMF payments by protest must act within ninety days of the
date of the HMF payment or the constitutional challenge by pro-
test will be barred by the statute of limitations.'
Even assuming a protest is timely filed and a denial re-
ceived, a further time restriction is that an action in the CIT
challenging the denial of the protest must be commenced within
180 days after (1) the date of mailing of notice of denial of a
protest, or (2) the date of denial of the protest by operation of
law.' 52 The exporter must also be sure to file a summons for
each and every denied protest it receives within the 180 day pe-
riod. In sum, the protest route is purely prospective in nature
and plaintiffs should not be required to establish jurisdiction in
the CIT by filing a protest of the HMF levied on exports. 5
Customs Service intends to deny all timely protests it receives contesting pay-
ment of the [HMF] on constitutional grounds ....
Id. The critical flaw in the government's position is that because Customs merely col-
lects the HMF for the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers there is no protestable "decision"
under 19 U.S.C. § 1514. In such cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
held that jurisdiction is only under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i). Mitsubishi Elecs. America, Inc.
v. United States, - F3d. - (1994).
149. 19 C.F.R. § 174.12(e) (2) (1994); see Stephanie Hall, Court to Decide on Legality
ofHarborMaintenanceFeesJ. CoM., Feb. 22, 1995, at 1A (discussing Harbor Maintenance
Fee litigation and Slip Op. 95-23).
150. Pursuant to 19 C.F.tR § 24.24(e) (1) (ii), exporters must pay the HMF on a
quarterly basis. The quarters end on the last days of March, June, September, and
December, and payments are due 31 days after the close of each quarter. Therefore,
quarterly payments are due on May 1, July 31, October 31, and January 31.
151. In the case where a company has not paid the HMF until after receiving a
demand notice from U.S. Customs pursuant to an audit, the protest period should ar-
guably run from the date the "exaction" is made in accordance with 19 C.F.R.
§ 174.12(e)(2) (1994).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
153. In fact, the CIT recently exerted its jurisdiction to hear a case regarding the
overpayment of HMF on passenger cruise lines. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 94-169 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 21, 1994). In that case, the CIT held that the claim-
ant did not have to file a protest:
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Rather, Section 1581 (i) grants the CIT jurisdiction over an
action challenging the constitutionality of the HIF. First, as
demonstrated above, jurisdiction under another statute is "mani-
festly inadequate." Second, the Water Resources Development
Act of 1986 falls within the text of Section 1581(i). The Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 is a law providing for "reve-
nue from imports" within the meaning of Section 1581(i) (1) be-
cause the HMF is levied, at least in part, on imports. It should
not matter that the action challenging the HMF challenges the
HMF as applied to exports, rather than imports."' All that Sec-
tion 1581(i) (1) requires is that the law provide for revenue from
imports. That the law also provides for revenue from exports
should be immaterial under Conoco. For example, in Conoco, the
government argued that Section 1581(i) did not apply to an ac-
tion arising out of the FTZA because the thrust of a FTZ is to
promote exports, while Section 1581 (i) deals with imports. The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument because it did not reflect
[A]s plaintiffs correctly point out, there was no decision of Customs which the
[plaintiff] could protest. The [plaintiffs] simply filed payments with quarterly
summary reports as required by regulation. Moreover, while the [plaintiffs]
seek a refund, they do not seek a refund on the basis of a change, error, or
omission of the type contemplated by the Amended Quarterly Summary Re-
port described in 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(5). Rather they seek to challenge Cus-
toms' interpretation of the statute as it pertains to the charge paid for trans-
portation. Hence, not only is there no decision of Customs from which the
[plaintiffs] may protest, were there such a decision, protesting it would be
futile given the remedy the [plaintiffs] seek.
Id. at 10.
154. In Carnival Cruise Lines, the CIT stated:
While it is true that [Section 1581 (i) (2)], on its face deals with merchandise,
the overwhelming subject matter with which this court has jurisdiction deals
with merchandise. This should not be interpreted to mean that when Con-
gress designated harbor fees to be treated as customs duties for the purpose of
determining the jurisdiction of a given court, it meant only to grant jurisdic-
tion over commercial cargo when that phrase means merchandise - to the
exclusion of passengers for hire. No, by the plain language of the statute Con-
gress intended for harbor fees to be applied to commercial cargo, whether
that term contemplates merchandise or passengers for hire. Furthermore,
Congress intended that such fees be treated as customs duties with all of the
attendant administrative, enforcement andjudicial processes concerning such
duties. That such processes most often deal with goods and not services is of
little moment when applying this Court's jurisdictional provisions to the Har-
bor Maintenance Revenue Act.
Id. at 11 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the CIT'sjurisdiction is not limited to import
transactions.
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"commercial realities."I55
The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 is also a law
providing for "tariffs, duties, or fees from importations for rea-
sons other than the raising of revenue" because it is a duty and/
or fee levied, at least in part, on importations for the purpose of
creating a trust fund for the maintenance of harbors. Finally,
the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 also provides for
"administration and enforcement" of the HMF within the mean-
ing of Section 1581 (i) (4). When combined with clear Congres-
sional intent that the CIT exercise jurisdiction over HMF dis-
putes, the fact that jurisdiction under Section 1581 (a) is "mani-
festly inadequate," and Conoco's reemphasis on Congress' intent
to centralize adjudication over disputes arising under U.S. inter-
national trade laws, the CIT should find that it has jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 1581(i) over a constitutional challenge to
the HMF as applied to exports.
B. Action Challenging Method Used to Make GSP Beneficiay
Country Determination
As noted previously, in International Labor Rights Education &
Research Fund v. Bush, the district court for the District of Colum-
bia held that it had jurisdiction over an action alleging that the
President did not conduct a "meaningful" investigation of
whether GSP beneficiary countries adhered to workers' rights
standards.' 6 On appeal, two of three federal appellate judges
agreed with the district court that the CIT did not have exclusive
jurisdiction.15 7 Under the GSP statute at issue, the United States
provided duty-free treatment to certain products of eligible ben-
eficiary countries.'58 To be eligible for GSP treatment, however,
beneficiary countries were required to provide workers with in-
ternationally recognized workers' rights.' 59 The GSP statute also
required the President to conduct a "general review" of benefici-
ary country status not later than January 4, 1987 and "periodi-
cally thereafter."160
155. 18 F.3d at 1590 n.24.
156. I& 752 F. Supp. 495, 497 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
157. 954 F. 2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
158. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988).
159. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Other requirements also ap-
ply. See id. § 2462(b)(1)-(6), (c).
160. Id. § 2464(c) (2) (A) (1988).
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The plaintiffs in International Labor Rights Education & Re-
search Fund alleged that the President had failed to comply with
the requirements of the GSP law because the President had not
conducted a meaningful investigation since 1985.161 On the is-
sue of jurisdiction, the district court and two judges of the D.C.
Circuit concluded that the GSP statute was not described in Sec..
tion 1581(i) because other statutes, not the GSP, "provided for"
tariffs, duties, and fees.1 6 2 According to the district court, the
GSP statute merely created conditions under which duties were
lifted and/or reimposed .1 3 The district court also reasoned that
the CIT did not have exclusive jurisdiction because the action
did not involve application of the CIT's expertise in trade mat-
ters.16
The result reached on the jurisdictional issue by the district
court and Judges Sentelle and Mikva of the D.C. Circuit is
wrong. First, prior to International Labor Rights Education & Re-
search Fund, the CIT had held that it has jurisdiction over an ac-
tion arising out of the GSP statute. 6 5 In Luggage & Leather Goods
Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiffs
claimed that the President's designation of man-made fiber
goods as GSP-eligible violated the GSP statute because that stat-
ute prohibited the President from designating certain textile
and apparel articles for GSP eligibility.166 In deciding that it had
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to Section 1581 (i), the CIT
reasoned that because the GSP statute permitted duty-free entry
for products normally subject to duty, it fell within the text of
Section 1581(i) (1) and (4). 67 While one may criticize the CIT's
161. 752 F. Supp. at 497.
162. Id. at 491.
163. IR at 491-92.
164. IM. at 491. On the merits, the district court noted that the GSP statute did not
specify that the President was to make any finding of fact and that the President implic-
itly has discretion and separate authority in foreign policy. Id. at 497-99. Accordingly,
the district court stated that it could not interfere with the President's discretionary
judgment. Id.
165. Luggage & Leather Goods Mfgs. of America v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
1413 (Ct. Int'! Trade 1984).
166. Id. at 1415; see 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (c) (1) (A) (1998 & Supp. V 1993) (explaining
that President may not designate article as eligible article if article is textile and apparel
article subject to textile agreements).
167. 588 F. Supp. at 1419. The CIT reasoned:
The Trade Act of 1974 (which includes the GSP) provides for tariffs and duties
although the GSP program authorizes duty-free entry under certain circum-
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conclusion that a statute providing for the removal of duties is a
law "providing for" duties within Section 1581 (i) (1),168 the CIT's
conclusion that the GSP statute is a law providing for the "ad-
ministration and enforcement" of a law providing for duties pur-
suant to Section 1581(i) (4) is sound because the GSP sets the
conditions under which duties will be lifted and/or levied.
Therefore, in light of Luggage & Leather Goods Manufacturers, the
district court and the D.C. Circuit in International Labor Rights
Education & Research Fund should have dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.169
Second, the determination that the CIT has jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 1581 (i) over an action arising out of the
GSP statute is supported fully by the reasoning of Conoco and
Miami Free Trade Zone Corp.170 In Conoco and Miami Free Trade
Zone, the Federal Circuit and D.C. Circuit, respectively, held that
the Free Trade Zone Act provided for the "administration and
enforcement" of a law providing for duties. The GSP statute is
similar to the Free Trade Zone Act in that it also sets the condi-
tions for lifting and levying duties. Moreover, as Judge Hender-
son noted in International Labor Rights Education & Research Fund,
the GSP is an international trade law and the CIT has expertise
in interpreting trade laws. Accordingly, Conoco and Miami Free
Trade Zone Corp. establish that jurisdiction in the CIT would be
proper if the same or a similar action were brought today.
stances. Defendants also ignore the fact that the TSUS provision claimed by
plaintiffs to be applicable to the subject merchandise... normally imposes a
duty of 20% ad valorem ... and thus provides for "revenue from imports".
Since the issue in this case is whether merchandise, normally dutiable .... is
duty-free .... the Court plainly possesses subject matterjurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1) and (4).
Id.
168. See Miami Free Trade Zone Corp. v. United States, 22 F.3d 1110, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (criticizing Conoco's conclusion that Free Trade Zone Act provided for duties
because Free Trade Zone Act lifted, rather than imposed, duties, but agreeing that Free
Trade Zone Act is law providing for administration and enforcement of law providing
for duties).
169. While a decision of the CIT is not clearly binding on the D.C. Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit should have dismissed the action because the GSP statute is clearly de-
scribed by Section 1581 (1) (4).
170. Of course, these cases were decided subsequent to International Labor
Rights.
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C. Actions Involving Penalties Under 19 U.S.C. § 1592
In Conoco, the Federal Circuit set forth a clear admonish-
ment "It is time to bring to an end the unproductive jurisdic-.
tional ping-pong games, and to give litigants their right to expe-
ditious and timely decisions on the merits of their claims." 71
Unfortunately, in the area of civil penalties, these ping-pong
games continue and, at the present time, it remains a point of
speculation whether the CIT would ever exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) in a penalty case. 172
Under Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
U.S. Customs may assess a civil penalty for statements-or material
omissions made in relation to the importation of goods.' 73 Pen-
alties are either a multiple of the loss of duties or a percentage of
the value of the goods, depending on the level of culpability. 74
171. 18 F.3d at 1590.
172. Shiepe & Colwell v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1430 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
173. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
(1) General rule
Without regard to whether the United States is or may be deprived of all
or a portion of any lawful duty thereby, no person, by fraud, gross negligence,
or negligence-
(A) may enter, introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce any mer-
chandise into the commerce of the United States by means of-
(i) any document or electronically transmitted data or informa-
tion written or oral statement, or act which is material, or
(ii) any omission which is material, or
(B) may aid or abet any other person to violate subparagraph (A).
(2) Exception
Clerical errors or mistakes of fact are not violations of paragraph (1) un-
less they are part of a pattern of negligent conduct. The mere nonintentional
repetition by an electronic system of an initial clerical error does not consti-
tute a pattern of negligent conduct.
Id.
174. Id. § 1592(c). Section 1592 provides for the following maximum penalties:
(1) Fraud -A fraudulent violation of subsection (a) of this section is pun-
ishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the domestic value of the
merchandise.
(2) Gross negligence - A grossly negligent violation of subsection (a) of
this section is punishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed -
(A) the lesser of -
(i) the domestic value of the merchandise, or
(ii) four times the lawful duties of which the United States is or
may be deprived, or
(B) if the violation did not affect the assessment of duties, 40 per-
cent of the dutiable value of the merchandise.
(3) Negligence - A negligent violation of subsection (a) of this section is
punishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed -
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There is also an elaborate pre-penalty and penalty notice process
with accompanying administrative proceedings, whereby the im-
porter can petition U.S. Customs for remission or mitigation of
the penalty.17 5 Potential penalties may also be severely limited if
Customs finds the importer has made a valid prior disclosure.176
The CIT has jurisdiction of the suits by the government to
collect the penalty.177 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has
found a "gap in the jurisdiction" of the CIT in those cases where
litigants seek a refund of penalties paid during the administra-
tive process. 78 In that situation, the U.S. district court may be
the only avenue open for litigants. 79 In addition, litigants have
faired poorly in their quest to invoke the CIT's jurisdiction to
review the legality of Customs' action during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, Conoco notwithstanding. 180
For example, in Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. United
States,'8 the importer brought suit in the CIT to challenge Cus-
toms' decision to issue a penalty notice while its penalty mitiga-
tion petition was pending. The CIT declined to exercise juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because, as the administrative
process was pending, the government might ultimately decide
not to collect a penalty. 8 2 The court also found the importer
(A) the lesser of -
(i) the domestic value of the merchandise, or
(ii) two times the lawful duties of which the United States is or
may be deprived, or
(B) if the violation did not affect the assessment of duties, 20 per-
cent of the dutiable value of the merchandise.
Id.
175. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b). Customs authority to mitigate claims can be found in 19
U.S.C. § 1618. See 19 C.F.R. § 171 app. B (1994) (describing Customs' Mitigation
Guidelines).
176. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c) (4). A prior disclosure is a mechanism to encourage vol-
untary reporting of violations prior to discovery by Customs, whereby penalties are lim-
ited to 100 percent of the lost duties in the case of fraud and interest on the back duties
in negligence and gross negligence cases.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1582. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e), trial in the CIT is de novo
and the government bears the burden of proof.
178. Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
179. Id.; Shiepe & Colwell v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1430 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994).
180. Playhouse Import & Export, Inc. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 716 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), rehearing denied, No. 92-08-00587, 1994 WL 194096 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 13,
1994).
181. 678 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
182. Id. at 897.
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had failed to show irreparable harm, so it could not invoke the
CIT's residual jurisdiction.1 8 3 The court specifically stated it
lacked jurisdiction, "to the extent the government has not
moved to collect any penalty assessed."18 4 Thus, in Dennison
Manufacturing, the CIT seemed to imply that an importer may
never be able to mount a court challenge to the validity of Cus-
toms' decision to issue the penalty until after the importer has
gone through the administrative process, refused to pay the pen-
alty and then sat back and waited for the U.S. government to sue
the importer.185
Moreover, in other CIT cases, importers invoked the prior
disclosure mechanism or paid mitigated penalties at their peril,
because the court found that penalties paid voluntarily are not
"charges or exactions" for which the court can assert jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).6 In Trayco, Inc. v. United States,
however, the importer was able to demonstrate facts indicating
that the penalty was not paid willingly, and was thus able to sue
for a refund, albeit in federal district court.1 7 In Trayco, U.S.
Customs at the Port of Charleston had seized a shipment of
shower heads for improper country of origin marking and later
released them to the importer for marking on the importer's
premises.188 The importer then certified to Customs in writing
that the products had been properly marked, but when Customs
reinspected, it erroneously concluded that the shipment was still
in violation of the marking law. 89 Consequently, Customs is-
sued a prepenalty and a subsequent penalty notice, alleging the
importer had made a false statement in certifying the merchan-
dise was properly marked.1 90
Trayco filed petitions in response to both notices and after
Customs failed to mitigate the penalty in its entirety, it paid the




186. Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 223 (CusL Ct. 1980), aff'd,
651 F. 2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981); ITT Semiconductors v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 641
(CL Int'l Trade 1983);Jose G. Flores, Inc. v. United States, 676 F. Supp. 1223 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
187. Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F. 2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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ond supplemental petition for release. 9' Specifically, Trayco
sent a check and cover letter along with its second supplemental
petition, noting payment was made, "under protest reserving all
rights to judicial review following the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies." 19 2 When Customs failed to grant further mitiga-
tion, Trayco sought refunds under the Little Tucker Act in the
U.S. District Court for South Carolina.'9 The district court
found for Trayco and the government appealed, asserting that
Congress intended to give exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT in
disputes regarding penalties.1 94
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, re-
jected the government's position that the CIT had exclusive ju-
risdiction. The Federal Circuit concluded that a "gap" exists in
the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction in cases where the importer seeks
a refund of an improperly assessed penalty under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592.195 In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to go
beyond the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 by stating: "[We
... conclude that if Congress had intended all import-related
matters to come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade it would have specifically said so."'19 The
CIT has since dismissed at least one importer's suit for penalty
refund on the basis of the Trayco decision, while at the same time
questioning the continuing jurisdictional uncertainty that would
necessarily result from its decision. 9 "
Further, Conoco appears to have had a limited impact on im-
porter initiated suits in penalty cases. In Playhouse Import &'Ex-
port v. United States, the importer brought suit in the CIT to chal-
lenge Customs' decision not to recognize its written submissions
as a valid prior disclosure, asserting various jurisdictional bases,
including 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). 98 In a decision issued shortly
before the Federal Circuit's decision in Conoco, the CIT strictly
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 834 nn.5, 6.
194. Id. at 835-36.
195. Id. at 836.
196. Id.
197. Shiepe & Colwell v. U.S., 866 F.Supp. 1430 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994) (penalty
proceeding involving EPA/DOT regulations for imported vehicles, not one initiated
under 19 U.S.C. § 1592).
198. Playhouse Import & Export, Inc. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 716 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), rehearing denied, No. 92-08-00587 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 13, 1994).
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followed the rationale of Dennison Manufacturing'99 by declining
to invoke its residual jurisdiction where Customs had not yet
sought to collect a penalty.2"' The Court found a remedy was
available, because the importer could challenge Customs' deci-
sion in its defense to any action brought by the government
under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 to collect a penalty.20 1
Subsequent to Conoco, however, the plaintiff in Playhouse
moved for a rehearing, alleging that in light of Conoco, the court
had incorrectly concluded that jurisdiction did not exist under
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). 202 In denying the motion, the CIT found
the importer's reliance on Conoco was misplaced because Conoco
simply recognized that § 1581(i) jurisdiction "is appropriate only
when no other remedy is available or when other remedies that
may be available are shown to be manifestly inadequate."20 3
The court reasoned that the importer failed to show that
the remedy was inadequate, in spite of allegations of damage to
the importer's credit rating, because as the administrative pro-
ceeding was not yet even at the prepenalty stage, any potential
civil penalties were not yet contingent liabilities that needed to
be reported in the company's financial statements.0 4 The court
found "no clear evidence of injury," because the importer con-
tinued to operate his business and engage in import transac-
tions.20 5 However, by finding that the importer in this case
failed to establish that it would suffer "irremediable adverse con-
sequences," the CIT presented importers in general with an in-
triguing question: whether there is a case where the CIT would
find jurisdiction for it to review Customs' decision to issue a pen-
alty notice, given that the administrative proceeding was still
pending.206
Hypothetically, a fact-pattern can be created where the CIT
should exercise its residual jurisdiction. It is interesting to note
that the legislative history to 19 U.S.C. § 1592 unequivocally ex-
plains that the statute was redrafted to include levels of culpabil-
199. 678 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
200. Id. at 897.
201. Playhouse Import & Export, Inc., 843 F. Supp at 720.
202. No. 92-08-00587 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 18, 1994).
203. Id. at 1.
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ity and an expanded administrative process, because of the docu-
mented damage caused by the huge contingent liabilities cre-
ated under the prior statute.2 °7 Ironically, the length of the
administrative proceeding may cause the damage Congress
sought to alleviate.
It is not uncommon for administrative proceedings to last
several years.218 As noted above, once a penalty notice is issued,
the amount of penalty becomes a contingent liability that must
be reported in a company financial statement. A reserve ac-
count must also be set aside to cover any eventual liability.20 9 In
addition, because the company is an alleged violator of the cus-
toms laws, its shipments may be subject to intensive inspections
at the border, causing delays in deliveries to the company's cus-
tomers. The company must also carefully weigh the risks of ad-
verse publicity in waiting to simply defend its honor in a suit
filed by the government in the CIT. 210
Such factors can combine to cause a severe strain on an im-
porter's ability to remain in business long enough to survive the
administrative process and to defend a suit in the CIT. In the
area of antidumping administrative proceedings, the CIT has al-
lowed companies to challenge the legality of the proceeding
rather than waiting for later court review. 211 However, when at-
207. S. REP. No. 778, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2211, 2113-14.
208. For example, in United States v. N.S. International, No. 92-11-00770 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), the court documents show the prepenalty notice was issued by Customs on June
10, 1988, and the penalty notice was issued on November 14, 1989. The government
did not file suit in the CIT until three years later on November 20, 1992. The im-
porter's Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 10, 1993, was undecided by the CIT when the
parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal based on a Settlement Agreement in 1994, over
six years after the Prepenalty Notice was first issued.
209. FINANCIAL AccomuOnr STANDARDS BomAD STATEMENT No. 5; see Barnickol et
al., Accountingfor Litigation and Claims,J. Accr.,June 1985, at 56 (explaining that under
FASB Statement No. 5, loss must be recorded for litigation or claims if it is probable
that liability has been incurred at financial statement date and amount of loss can be
reasonably estimated).
210. Although involving alleged criminal customs violations, the example of the
collapse of Gitano following the loss of its major customer, Wal-mart (following a deci-
sion by some Gitano executives to enter guilty pleas), cannot be lightly ignored. See
Phyllis Furman & Miriam Leuchter, Ripped at the Seams, CR'n's N.Y. Bus., May 16, 1994,
at 17.
211. See, e.g., Techsnabexport, Ltd. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1992) (CIT has jurisdiction under Section 1581(i) over action challenging legal-
ity of antidumping procedures); Associacao Dos Industriais de Cordoaria e Redes v.
United States, 828 F. Supp. 978 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) (CIT has jurisdiction over an
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tempting to seek judicial relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) during
a penalty administrative process, the importer gambles that he
or she will be able to meet a sufficient evidentiary threshold to
show "irremediable adverse consequences," short of the death of
the company. For a small importer, documented warnings from
its largest customer to discontinue new business if shipment de-
lays continue may be sufficient in some circumstances for the
CIT to invoke jurisdiction, decide the validity of the penalty no-
tice and perhaps spare the importer the "considerable time, ef-
fort and money the administrative proceeding would entail."2"2
Similarly, a letter from the same importer's bank informing
the company that it will be unable to extend the company's line
of borrowing credit if a prepenalty notice (with a resulting con-
tingent liability) is issued by Customs, may demonstrate suffi-
cient potential for irreparable harm for the CIT to intervene and
decide whether Customs' position is valid.213 Without clear gui-
dance from Congress, however, it is unclear whether a higher
threshold, such as actual loss of customers and/or lost jobs or
lower stock prices would be required for those larger importers
who possess greater resources. Thus, these "gaps in jurisdiction"
lead to absurd results, whereby the CIT can hear a suit concern-
ing the protection of sea turtles but cannot hear an importer's
suit involving such cornerstones of import law as the civil penalty
statute. 214 In the area of penalties, Conoco does nothing to free
the CIT's hands and the jurisdictional ping-pong games will con-
tinue until Congress decides to act.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs bringing actions under Section 1581 (i) in the fu-
action seeking mandamus ordering government agencies to terminate antidumping in-
vestigations with prejudice).
212. See, e.g., Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States,
717 F. Supp. 847 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (numerous small agricultural companies should
not be required to first participate in antidumping review).
213. See, e.g., Pistachio Group v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986) (postponed review was inadequate, partly based on affidavit submitted showing
one company could riot obtain customs bond from bond company without letter of
credit).
214. See, eg., U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988) (drawing distinction between injuries incurred due to manifest inade-




ture should demonstrate that other jurisdictional statutes are
"manifestly inadequate" and that their action arises out of a law
described in Section 1581(i). No doubt, courts will continue to
wrestle with the determination of whether a particular law "pro-
vides for revenue from imports" or "provides for tariffs" as
demonstrated by the Conoco and Miami Free Trade Zone decisions.
When analyzing jurisdiction, courts should be mindful of Con-
gress' desire to have international trade disputes adjudicated in
one national forum, namely, the Court of International Trade.
